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United Airlines Flight 175 complete timeline
0600-0700 6:20 a.m.-7:48 a.m. All the alleged 9/11 hijackers reportedly check in at the airports from where they board Flights 11, 175, 77, and 93. COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 1-4; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 27, 89, 93 Since 1998, the FAA has required air carriers to implement a program called the Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS). NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 4/1/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 1/27/2004; US CONGRESS, 3/17/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 2, 85 . According to the 9/11 Commission, nine of the 19 hijackers are flagged by the CAPPS system before boarding Flights 11, 175, 77, and 93. POST, 1/28/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 84; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA V. ZACARIAS MOUSSAOUI, A/K/A SHAQIL, A/K/A ABU KHALID AL SAHRAWI, DEFENDANT, 3/6/2006 All of the hijackers subsequently pass through security checkpoints before boarding their flights. COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 1-4 6:20 a.m.-6:53 a.m. Two Flight 175 Hijackers Check in at United Airlines Ticket Counter; Uncertainty Over Their Identities Two of the Flight 175 hijackers approach Gail Jawahir,a customer service representative, at the United Airlines ticket counter at Boston’s Logan Airport. The two appear unaccustomed to traveling. One tells Jawahir, that he needs a ticket, though upon examining his documents she finds he already has one. Both men have problems answering standard security questions, which Jawahir has to repeat very slowly until they give the routine, reassuring answers. There is conflicting evidence over their identities. Jawahir will place her encounter with the men at “shortly before 7 a.m.” Shown photos of the alleged hijackers after 9/11, she will indicate that one of the two she encountered resembled Mohand Alshehri, suggesting the two were Alshehri and Fayez Ahmed Banihammad, who checked in at 6:53 a.m. Yet she recalls the two having the same last name and having assigned seats on Row 9 of the plane, suggesting they were Ahmed Alghamdi and Hamza Alghamdi, who checked in at 6:20 a.m. COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 2, 451; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 17-18, 89 6:20 a.m.-7:27 a.m. Flight 175 Hijackers Check In at Airport and Board Plane; None Selected for Additional Security Scrutiny All five Flight 175 hijackers reportedly check in at Boston’s Logan Airport, pass through a security checkpoint, and board their plane during this period. COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 89 Although reports claim that between two and five of the Flight 175 hijackers have one-way tickets, none are selected by CAPPS. 4/24/2002; US CONGRESS, 9/26/2002; US CONGRESS, 9/26/2002; WASHINGTON POST, 1/28/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 18 Two of them have problems answering security questions at the ticket counter (see (6:20 a.m.-6:53 a.m.) September 11, 2001). At the security checkpoint, all five would pass through a walk-through metal detector, and an X-ray machine would screen their carry-on luggage. But Logan Airport has no video surveillance of its checkpoints (see 1991-2000), so there is no documentary evidence of exactly when they go through, or how they are processed. Jennifer Gore, the young supervisor overseeing the checkpoint, is later unable to recall seeing any of them. The Globe and Mail will explain, “She was trained to look for metal bits in bags and in clothes, not people.” AND MAIL, 9/7/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 2; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 18 6:52 a.m.-6:55 a.m Call Placed from Payphone at Logan to Atta’s Cell Phone A three-minute call is made from a payphone at Boston’s Logan Airport, in the gate area from where Flight 175 will later depart, to Mohamed Atta’s cell phone. The 9/11 Commission will report, “We presume Shehhi [[Marwan Alshehhi]] made the call, but we cannot be sure.” According to the commission, this is Atta and Alshehhi’s final conversation. COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 1, 451; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 4 According to other reports, though, they later speak again briefly by cellphone while waiting for their planes to take off (see (Before 7:59 a.m.) September 11, 2001). YORK TIMES, 11/4/2001; TIME, 8/4/2002 7:00 a.m.-7:45 a.m. Computer Screening Program Selects Some Hijackers; Fails to Stop Them POST, 1/28/2004 No Flight 175 hijackers are selected. COMMISSION, 1/27/2004; BALTIMORE SUN, 1/27/2004 7:58 a.m. Flight 175 scheduled to depart but will actually take off 16 minutes later. POST, 9/12/2001; CNN, 9/17/2001; GUARDIAN, 10/17/2001; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 8/21/2002; NEWSDAY, 9/10/2002 Before 7:59 a.m. Inter Flight Phone Call Between Hijackers Mohamed Atta on Flight 11 calls hijacker Marwan Alshehhi in Flight 175 as both planes sit on the runway. They presumably confirm the plot is on. 8/4/2002 0800-0900 0900-1000 (9:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001: United Airlines Learns Flight 175 Is Missing from Radar The FAA’s New York Center informs the air traffic control coordinator at United Airlines’ headquarters, outside Chicago, that Flight 175 is missing from radar. Although Flight 175’s transponder signal changed at around 8:47 (see 8:46 a.m.-8:47 a.m. September 11, 2001), according to the 9/11 Commission the air traffic controller handling the flight only noticed the change at 8:51 (see 8:51 a.m.-8:53 a.m. September 11, 2001). 9:00 a.m. September 11, 2001: Flight 175 Passenger Peter Hanson Predicts Crash into Building Flight 175 passenger Peter Hanson calls his parents a second time, and says to his father, FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, 7/23/2004 }} (9:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001: United Airlines Chief Assures Employees that Crisis Is ‘Not a Drill’ When he arrives at the United Airlines System Operations Control (SOC) center, United’s chief operating officer Andy Studdert has to reassure employees that the unfolding crisis is not a training exercise. TRIBUNE, 7/16/2003 Shortly before 9:00 a.m., Studdert had been in a meeting at the United Airlines headquarters, outside Chicago, with United’s CEO Jim Goodwin. His secretary had rushed in and told him about the first plane hitting the World Trade Center. Studdert immediately got up and ran across to the SOC, located next to the headquarters building. STREET JOURNAL, 10/15/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 1/27/2004 However, ten days previously, he had surprised the staff there with a crisis-training exercise, where he’d told them a flight over the Pacific had broken radio contact and suffered a potentially disastrous engine failure. For 30 minutes, the staff had believed the story, before he told them the truth. So when he arrives at the SOC at around 9:00 a.m., the Chicago Tribune will report, Studdert senses disbelief among his employees at the real-world crisis. He therefore shouts out to reassure them, “This is not a drill!” According to USA Today, the staff already realizes this. TODAY, 8/13/2002; CHICAGO TRIBUNE, 7/16/2003; 9/11 COMMISSION, 1/27/2004 (9:01 a.m.-9:04 a.m.) September 11, 2001: United Airlines Dispatcher and Air Traffic Control Coordinator Try Contacting Flight 175 At the United Airlines System Operations Control (SOC) center outside Chicago, flight dispatcher Ed Ballinger learns that Flight 175 is suspected as being hijacked, and then sends text messages to try and make contact with it. COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 23-24 The SOC center has just been contacted by the United Airlines maintenance office in San Francisco, about a call it received from an attendant on Flight 175, who had reported that their plane had been hijacked (see Shortly Before 9:00 a.m. September 11, 2001). STREET JOURNAL, 10/15/2001 Subsequently, around 9:01 or 9:02, a dispatch manager at the SOC goes to Ballinger’s desk and informs him of the details of this call. COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 23 Ballinger is the flight dispatcher responsible for United’s aircraft flying from the East Coast to the West Coast, which include Flight 175 (and also Flight 93). DAILY HERALD, 4/14/2004 At 9:03, he sends an ACARS message to Flight 175: “How is the ride. Anything dispatch can do for you.” (ACARS is an e-mail system that enables personnel on the ground to rapidly communicate with those in the cockpit of an aircraft.) At the same time, the United Airlines air traffic control coordinator also sends an ACARS message to the flight: “NY approach lookin for ya on frequency 127.4.” Just after 9:03, unaware it has now crashed into the World Trade Center, Ballinger and the air traffic control coordinator re-send these ACARS messages to Flight 175. COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 9 AND 23-24 Twenty minutes later, Ballinger will remain unaware that Flight 175 has crashed and still be trying to contact it by ACARS (see 9:23 a.m. September 11, 2001). COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 26 All airlines have a staff of dispatchers like Ballinger who, under FAA rules, are responsible for monitoring aircraft in flight. They follow each flight’s progress, relay safety information, and handle any problems that arise. 2008, PP. 14 AND 35 United Airlines dispatchers typically monitor up to two dozen flights at once. 2002, PP. 68 Ballinger has 16 transcontinental flights taking off early this morning that he is responsible for. YORK OBSERVER, 6/20/2004 Entity Tags: Ed Ballinger Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 175 (Shortly Before 9:02 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Boston Center Military Liaison Learns of Second Hijacking over FAA Teleconference Colin Scoggins, the military liaison at the FAA’s Boston Center, learns from an FAA teleconference that there is a second hijacked plane over the US. He has previously called the FAA’s New York Center and was told, “We’re working a hijack,” but mistakenly thought the controller was referring to Flight 11 (see (Between 8:40 a.m. and 8:54 a.m.) September 11, 2001). According to author Lynn Spencer, Scoggins now hears on the FAA headquarters’ hijack teleconference of the second hijacked airliner, Flight 175. 2008, PP. 48-49 AND 82 Spencer’s account is consistent with a May 2003 statement by the FAA, according to which the FAA established its teleconference “within minutes after the first aircraft hit the World Trade Center” (see (8:50 a.m.) September 11, 2001). COMMISSION, 5/23/2003 But the 9/11 Commission will claim that the FAA headquarters’ hijacking teleconference is only established at “about 9:20” (see (9:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001). COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 36 According to Spencer, Scoggins assumes that NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) is also on the FAA teleconference and is receiving the same information that he is about the second hijacking. However, the “FAA headquarters’ teleconference is between air traffic control facilities, the FAA Command Center, the Defense Department, and several other agencies; NORAD is not looped in.” 2008, PP. 82 Although the FAA will claim that the “Air Force liaison to the FAA immediately joined the FAA headquarters teleconference and established contact with NORAD on a separate line,” the Air Force liaison will subsequently claim she only joins the teleconference after 9:37 a.m., when the Pentagon is hit (see (Shortly After 9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001). COMMISSION, 5/23/2003; US DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 8/31/2006 Even though Scoggins assumes NEADS is already aware of the information, he will subsequently call it with the news of the second hijacking (see (9:02 a.m.-9:07 a.m.) September 11, 2001). 2008, PP. 82 Entity Tags: Colin Scoggins, Federal Aviation Administration, Northeast Air Defense Sector Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 175 (9:01 a.m.) September 11, 2001: FAA’s New York Center Informs TRACON Controllers about Flight 175 The FAA’s New York Center contacts the New York Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) and asks for help in locating Flight 175. Different air traffic controllers scan different altitudes, and TRACON controllers only deal with low-flying planes. These controllers have remained uninformed about the fate of Flight 11 until about now. “We had 90 to 120 seconds; it wasn’t any 18 minutes,” one controller wil later recall, referring to the actual elapsed time between the two crashes. Another controller will say of Flights 11 and 175: “They dove into the airspace. By the time anybody saw anything, it was over.” YORK TIMES, 9/13/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004 Entity Tags: New York Terminal Radar Approach Control, New York Air Route Traffic Control Center Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 175 9:01 a.m.-9:02 a.m. September 11, 2001: Military Liaison at New York Center Informed of Flight 175 Hijacking; Says Responding Fighters Are in the Air The military liaison at the FAA’s New York Center is reportedly told that Flight 175 has been hijacked. The information is passed on to the liaison by New York Center manager Peter Mulligan. In an apparent reference to the hijacking on a phone bridge with other air traffic control facilities, Mulligan first says the situation is escalating (see (9:01 a.m.) September 11, 2001) and adds, “Just get me somebody who has the authority to get military in the air now.” Mulligan then drops out of the teleconference for a short while, but returns and says: “It’s OK. I’ve got it taken care of over here. I got… my military guy. We got some interceptors in the air.” AVIATION AUTHORITY, 10/14/2003, PP. 15-17 According to the 9/11 Commission Report, Mulligan says this between 9:01 and 9:02. COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 22 A person at the New York Center then calls NEADS at 9:03 (see (9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Presumably, this is the military liaison Mulligan just informed of the hijacking. Entity Tags: Peter Mulligan Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 175 (9:02 a.m.-9:07 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Boston Center Military Liaison Calls NEADS about Second Hijacking Moments before Flight 175 crashes into the World Trade Center, Colin Scoggins, the military liaison at the FAA’s Boston Center, calls NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) to notify it that there is a second hijacked aircraft over the US. Scoggins learned of the second hijacking on the FAA headquarters’ hijack teleconference (see (Shortly Before 9:02 a.m.) September 11, 2001) and senses that he should call NEADS with this latest information. According to author Lynn Spencer, Scoggins “imagines that he must be one of dozens of FAA facilities flooding NEADS with phone calls. What he doesn’t know is that his is in fact the only one giving them information about the flights this morning, other than the coverage on CNN.” 2008, PP. 82 However, the 9/11 Commission will say that NEADS also learns of the second hijacking around this time from the FAA’s New York Center, stating, “The first indication that the NORAD air defenders had of the second hijacked aircraft, United 175, came in a phone call from New York Center to NEADS at 9:03” (see (9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 23 Just after Scoggins reports the second hijacking to NEADS, those on the NEADS operations floor see the live television coverage of Flight 175 hitting the South Tower on a screen at the front of the room. 2008, PP. 82 Apparently, Scoggins’s phone call continues for several minutes: According to the 9/11 Commission, “Between 9:04 a.m. and 9:07 a.m., the NEADS identification technicians were on the phone with FAA Boston Center seeking further information on Flight 175 when Boston Center confirmed a second crash at the World Trade Center.” COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 24 Entity Tags: Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center, Colin Scoggins, Northeast Air Defense Sector Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 175 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001: Boston Center Tells FAA Regional Office that Hijackers Said ‘We Have Planes’; Office Suggests Notifying Military Terry Biggio. Federal Aviation Administration Over an FAA teleconference, Terry Biggio, the operations manager at the FAA’s Boston Center, reports to the FAA’s New England regional office the “We have some planes” comment apparently made by a Flight 11 hijacker at 8:24 a.m. (see 8:24 a.m. September 11, 2001). COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 23 ; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 79-80 Because the Boston Center controller monitoring Flight 11 had not understood the communication, the center’s quality assurance specialist had been instructed to “pull the tape” of the transmission, listen to it carefully, and then report back. COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 19 Biggio now reports to the New England region representative: “I’m gonna reconfirm with, with downstairs, but the, as far as the tape, Bobby seemed to think the guy said that ‘we have planes.’ Now, I don’t know if it was because it was the accent, or if there’s more than one plane, but I’m gonna, I’m gonna reconfirm that for you, and I’ll get back to you real quick. Okay?” Another participant in the teleconference asks, “They have what?” and Biggio clarifies: “Planes, as in plural.… It sounds like, we’re talking to New York, that there’s another one aimed at the World Trade Center.… A second one just hit the Trade Center.” The New England region representative replies: “Okay. Yeah, we gotta get—we gotta alert the military real quick on this.” COMMISSION, 6/17/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 23 A manager at the FAA’s Command Center in Herndon, Virginia, is monitoring the teleconference, and so also learns of the “We have some planes” communication at this time (see 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001). 2008, PP. 79-80 At 9:05 a.m., Biggio will confirm for the New England region representative—with the Command Center listening in—that a hijacker said, “we have planes” (forgetting the “some”). COMMISSION, 6/17/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 24 Entity Tags: Federal Aviation Administration, Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center, Terry Biggio Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 11, Flight UA 175 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001: Newark Controllers Watch Flight 175 Hit WTC Rick Tepper. Eileen Blass Air traffic controllers at Newark International Airport in New Jersey are on the phone with controllers at the FAA’s New York Center and are asked to find Flight 175 from their windows. They see it and watch in horror as it drops the last 5,000 feet and crashes into the World Trade Center. Controller Rick Tepper will recall: “He was in a hard right bank, diving very steeply and very fast. And he—as he was coming up the Hudson River, he—he made another hard left turn and—just heading for downtown Manhattan.… You could see that he was trying to line himself up on the tower. Just before he hit the tower, he almost leveled it out and just—just hit the building.” Newark tower immediately calls the FAA’s Herndon Command Center and says it will not land any more airplanes in Newark, in an effort to keep aircraft away from New York City. This is the first step in shutting down the national airspace system. 9/11/2002 Entity Tags: Rick Tepper, Federal Aviation Administration, New York Air Route Traffic Control Center, Newark International Airport Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 175 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001: Flight 175 Crashes into WTC South Tower; Millions Watch Live on Television Flight 175 hits the WTC South Tower. The picture was taken from a traffic helicopter. WABC 7/ Salient Stills Flight 175 hits the South Tower of the World Trade Center (Tower Two). Seismic records pinpoint the time at six seconds before 9:03 a.m. (rounded to 9:03 a.m.). YORK TIMES, 9/12/2001; CNN, 9/12/2001; CNN, 9/17/2001; NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 9/18/2001; USA TODAY, 12/20/2001; FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, 5/1/2002, PP. 1-10; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 8/21/2002; USA TODAY, 9/2/2002; NEW YORK TIMES, 9/11/2002 According to the NIST report, the crash time is 9:02:59. INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, 9/2005, PP. 38 According to the 9/11 Commission Report, the crash time is 9:03:11. COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 8 Millions watch the crash live on television. The plane strikes the 77th through 85th floors in the 110-story building. Approximately 100 people are killed or injured in the initial impact; 600 people in the tower eventually die. The death toll is far lower than in the North Tower because about two-thirds of the South Tower’s occupants have evacuated the building in the 17 minutes since the first tower was struck. TODAY, 12/20/2001; NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, 9/2005, PP. 5-9, 41 The combined death toll from the two towers is estimated at 2,819, not including the hijackers. PRESS, 8/21/2002 The impact severs some columns on the south side of the South Tower. Each of the Twin Towers is designed as a “tube-in-tube” structure and the steel columns which support its weight are arranged around the perimeter and in the core. The plane, which is traveling at an estimated speed of around 500 mph (see October 2002-October 2005), severs 33 of the building’s 236 perimeter columns and damages another one. INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, 9/2005, PP. 39 The perimeter columns bear about half of the tower’s weight, so the damage to them reduces the tower’s ability to bear gravity loads by about 7.1 percent. INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, 9/2005, PP. 6 The actual damage to the 47 core columns is not known, as there are no photographs or videos of it, but there will be much speculation about this after 9/11. It will be suggested that some parts of the aircraft may be able to damage the core even after crashing through the exterior wall (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001). INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, 9/2005, PP. 107 According to NIST’s base case model, five of the core columns are severed and another five suffer some damage. INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS & TECHNOLOGY, 9/2005, PP. 235 This may reduce the tower’s ability to bear loads by a further approximately 8 percent, meaning that the aircraft impact accounted for a loss of about 15 percent of the building’s strength. This damage will be cited as an event contributing to the building’s collapse after 9/11 (see October 23, 2002 and October 19, 2004). NIST’s base case estimate of damage to the North Tower’s core will be similar, even though the aircraft impact there was dissimilar (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001). Flight 11 hit the North Tower’s core head on, whereas Flight 175 only hits the corner of the South Tower’s core. INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, 9/2005, PP. 20-23, 38-41 In addition, some of the fireproofing on the steel columns and trusses may be dislodged (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001). INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS & TECHNOLOGY, 9/2005, PP. XXXVI, 83 Photographs and videos of the towers will not show the state of fireproofing inside the buildings, but the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) will try to estimate the damage to fireproofing using a series of computer models. Its severe case model (see (October 2002-October 2005)) will predict that 39 of the 47 core columns are stripped of their fireproofing on one or more floors and that fireproofing is stripped from trusses covering 80,000 ft2 of floor area, the equivalent of about two floors. NIST will say that the loss of fireproofing is a major cause of the collapse (see April 5, 2005), but only performs 15 tests on fireproofing samples (see October 26, 2005). INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, 9/2005, PP. 41 According to NIST, less fireproofing is stripped from the North Tower (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: National Institute of Standards and Technology, World Trade Center Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Day of 9/11 Events, All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 175, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93, George Bush, World Trade Center, WTC Investigation 9:03 a.m. and After September 11, 2001: United Airlines Dispatchers Notify Flights of Aircraft Crashing into WTC, but Give No Warnings Beginning at 9:03, a number of United Airlines flight dispatchers send text messages to several United aircraft, indicating to the pilots that planes have flown into the World Trade Center. But, according to the 9/11 Commission, “These messages provided no details or warnings.” COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 36 It is not until 9:21 that United dispatchers are told to warn their flights to secure cockpit doors (see 9:21 a.m. September 11, 2001). COMMISSION, 1/27/2004 The dispatcher responsible for Flight 175 and Flight 93—Ed Ballinger—begins sending warning messages to the flights he is monitoring at 9:19 a.m., informing them that two aircraft have hit the WTC (see 9:19 a.m. September 11, 2001). COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 37 Airline dispatchers have an important part to play in managing aircraft in flight. According to commercial pilot and author Lynn Spencer, under FAA rules, dispatchers “take guardianship of each company aircraft in the sky. They are assigned to a certain number of aircraft and know all there is to know about each: who is flying, who is working the cabin, how many pounds of fuel are onboard, the flight plan, the alternate plan, and anything at all relevant to that flight. If there is a glitch in the system, the pilot talks to the dispatcher, and together they formulate a plan of action.” 2008, PP. 35 AND 72 United Airlines dispatchers are each responsible for monitoring from ten to 30 flights during a shift, and monitor anything up to two dozen flights at a time. 2002, PP. 68 Entity Tags: United Airlines, Ed Ballinger Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 175, Flight UA 93 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001: FAA Command Center Learns of Hijackers’ ‘We Have Some Planes’ Communication At the FAA’s Command Center in Herndon, Virginia, manager John White learns of the communication apparently made by a hijacker on Flight 11, stating “We have some planes” (see 8:24 a.m. September 11, 2001), and quickly notifies the national operations manager of this. Terry Biggio, the operations manager at the FAA’s Boston Center, is relaying all the information he has about Flight 11 to the Command Center’s teleconference. In the conference room at the Command Center, White is listening in. 2008, PP. 79-80 Because the air traffic controller monitoring Flight 11 had not understood the “We have some planes” hijacker communication, the Boston Center’s quality assurance specialist had been instructed to “pull the tape” of the transmission, listen to it carefully, and then report back. COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 19 Having learned that the specialist has deciphered the transmission, Biggio now relays the details of it over the teleconference. Seconds later, those at the Command Center see Flight 175 crashing into the South Tower of the World Trade live on CNN. White promptly dispatches a manager to pass on the details of the transmission to Ben Sliney, the national operations manager at the Command Center (see 9:06 a.m. and After September 11, 2001). 2008, PP. 79-80 The FAA’s New England regional office also learns of the “We have some planes” communication at this time (see 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001). COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 23 Entity Tags: Federal Aviation Administration, Ben Sliney, John White, Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center, Terry Biggio Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 11, Flight UA 175 1100-1200 11:53 a.m. September 11, 2001: United Airlines Publicly Confirms that Flight 175 Has Crashed finally issues a press release confirming that Flight 175 has crashed, nearly three hours after this aircraft hit the World Trade Center (see 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001). }} United Airlines previously issued a press release, at 11:17, confirming the crash of Flight 93 (see 11:17 a.m. September 11, 2001), but this had stated that the airline was, at that time, only “deeply concerned” about Flight 175. However, at 9:22, the United Airlines System Operations Control manager had issued an advisory to all the airline’s facilities, stating that Flight 175 had been in an accident in New York (see 9:22 a.m. September 11, 2001). And Colin Scoggins, the military liaison at the FAA’s Boston Center, will later claim that United confirmed to the center that Flight 175 was down, “within two or three minutes” (see (9:06 a.m.) September 11, 2001). References Category:Timeline